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Prior Restraints in Public Hfigh Schools
That the First Amendment freedom of speech applies to students in
the public high school context was settled by Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District.' Students invoking the
Tinker right have sometimes raised the question whether schools can
require them to submit publications they wish to distribute on school
premises for advance approval. Stated in other terms, the question has
been whether schools are entitled to impose prior restraints on printed
material.
After Tinker, the regulations governing distribution of materials
varied among schools. Some regulations specifically prohibited prior
restraints.2 Others were ambiguous. 3 Still others clearly required the
prior approval of the content of material to be distributed.4 From
among this latter class of regulations there arose several lawsuits assert-
ing that such regulations are impermissible. Four such lawsuits reached
1. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Tinker does not consider the First Amendment rights of students
in private high schools. This Note is likewise addressed only to public schools. It should
be observed, however, that many commentators argue that every school is a public in-
stitution. Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1035 (1969);
see, e.g., Cohen, The Private-Public Legal Aspects of Institutions of Higher Education,
45 DaxvaR LJ. 643 (1968).
Nor does this Note deal with prior restraints on the right of association or assmbly.
The Supreme Court recently addressed these questions in the college context. See Healy
v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). Finally, this Note is confined to an examination of the
question of prior restraints on student expression. Expression by outsiders on school
premises is subject to additional considerations.
2. In 1970 the Philadelphia Board of Education approved a High School Bill of
Rights. An accompanying memorandum, in discussing the distribution of prinled ma-
terial and petitions, says, "There shall be no prior censorship or requiremnent of approval
of the contents or wording of such material .... " P. Lines, Codes Governing Rights
and Conduct of High School Students 74, Apr. 15, 1971 (Center for Law and Education,
Harvard University).
In San Francisco, almost identical wording was adopted by the Board of Education
in March 1971:
Students shall be free to distribute handbills, leaflets and other printed material
and to collect signatures on petitions concerning either school or out-of-school
issues, whether such materials are produced within or outside the school. There
shall be no prior censorship or requirement of approval of the contents or wording
of such material ....
Id. at 99.
3. For example, in 1970 the State Board of Education of Washington promulgated
guidelines to assist local school districts in preparing regulations dealing with students*
rights. The guidelines, however, suggest only that regulations must be "reasonable," and
that schools should "develop creative ways of providing time and space for student
expression." Id. at 148-49. In 1971 the Massachusetts Department of Education. Youth
Advisory Council, issued Guidelines for Student Rights and Responsibilities. These in-
cluded an entire section on students' First Amendment rights, without a single reference
to prior restraints. In one sentence almost calculated to foster uncertainty, the regu-
lations said, "[NJon-school sponsored student publications should be subjected to lo-
cally determined procedures for distribution on school premises." Id. at 159.
4. The cases which have arisen are themselves proof that there are major school
districts which have imposed prior restraints on student expression. See pp. 1330-33 infra.
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four different federal courts of appeals. In three, the courts ruled that
the regulation was invalid because it was procedurally defective, but
that a properly drafted regulation requiring advance submission would
be permissible. The fourth court also held the regulation invalid, but
on the ground that prior restraints could not be constitutionally im-
posed in high schools.
This Note argues that Tinker does not authorize the imposition of
prior restraints in high schools. Properly understood, the case is fully
consistent with the general principle that speech may be regulated be-
cause of its potential for producing disorder; but such regulation can-
not take the form of prior restraints.
I
Student rights of speech derive from general legal doctrines govern-
ing freedom of expression which, in turn, are rooted in the First
Amendment. The Amendment, despite its absolute language forbid-
ding laws which abridge freedom of speech,a is properly read "to
permit reasonable regulation of speech-connected activities in care-
fully restricted circumstances."
Perhaps the most important justification for regulation of "speech-
connected activities" is the prevention of disorder. The possible sources
of disorder are conceptually twofold: the manner of the exercise of
speech, and its content. In preventing disorder arising from the first
of these two, the state may prescribe reasonable "time, place and man-
ner" regulations which provide a procedural framework for the exer-
cise of First Amendment rights.7 Their purpose is to allocate limited
societal resources fairly among competing demands. They may not con-
cern the content of speech, nor may they entirely foreclose the oppor-
5. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The First Amendment applies to the states by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
6. Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Comm. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
7. Regulations that govern the time and place of expression make no reference at
all to its content. Regulations of time state the permissible periods for expression or the
permissible duration of expression. Typically, such a regulation would prohibit dlistri.
bution of printed matter during class time. Regulations of place are similarly oriented.
They might forbid circulating material in the nurse's office, for example. See generally
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 298-310 (1970). Regulations governing
the manner of expression are more difficult to define:
"Manner" should be understood to denote only those physical and procedural in.
cidents of public expression that are neither "time" nor "place"-for example, the
size and number of posters that can be displayed in various locations, the volume
of sound amplification, chairmanship of public meetings, identification of persons
soliciting funds, methods of distributing literature, and the myriad other matters
that must be regulated in order effectively to regulate the speech situation.
O'Neil, Reflections on the Academic Senate Resolution, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 88, 104 (1966).
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tunity for expression. They must be carefully drawn so as to limit the
discretion of the officials who administer them," and may never be
used to prevent the expression of unpopular opinions.
The state is also permitted to regulate speech to prevent disorder
caused by its content. Three important issues are involved in instances
of regulation for this purpose. One is the legal standard of the degree
of threatened disorder which justifies interference with speech. A sec-
ond is the reasonableness of the state's determination that such a threat
exists in a particular circumstance. The third issue, which is really a
derivative of the first two, is the appropriate timing of state inter-
vention.
The most recent expression of the Supreme Court regarding the legal
standard is that the state may intervene where "advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action." In evaluating the reasonableness of an inter-
ference based on incitement, the content of the speech is certainly rele-
vant, but can hardly be regarded as determinative. The second half of
the standard would seem to require an analysis of the context of the
speech, particularly the reaction of its audience. Regard for the facts
of actual audience response anchors a court's determination in the re-
alities of a case, and enables it to serve as an effective check on the
actions of officials who may be overly cautious or who may wish to
prevent the expression of certain viewpoints.
This resolution of the first two issues suggests an answer to the third,
the timing of intervention: There should be a presumption against the
validity of intervention occurring before speech has been initiated.
Such "prior restraint" brings the question of the reasonableness of state
action to the courts without a framework of facts as to the evil to be
forestalled-facts as to the actual results of speech, not merely its possi-
8. In Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 US. 147 (1969). the Court struck down a
statute which gave the City Commission virtually absolute power to prohibit any
demonstration or parade on the city's streets or public ways because of the discretion
left with city officials to issue or deny permits for demonstrations. By comparison, in
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965), the Court upheld a statute which left to the
discretion of administrative officials the decision as to when a demonstration was "near"
a courthouse. The Court reasoned that the discretion involved was "not the type of
unbridled discretion which would allow an official to pick and choose among expres.
sions of view the ones he will permit to use the streets and other public facilities ..
Id. at 569.
9. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 595 U.S. 444,447 (1969).
Brandenburg echoes the classic "clear and present danger" test in requiring an ex-
amination of the circumstances as well as the content of expression: "The question in
every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such
a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the sub.
stantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent" Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 52 (1919).
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ble consequences. The absence of such facts from the court's considera-
tion inevitably reduces the probability that judicial supervision will be
adequate.' 0
Indeed, prior restraints have long been disfavored in Anglo-Ameri-
can law." Most recently, the unconstitutionality of prior restraints in
most situations was reaffirmed by the "Pentagon Papers" censorship
case. There, the Supreme Court reiterated that the government "car-
ries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such
a restraint.' '1 2 The combined effect of the diverse opinions in that case
was to emphasize the constitutional judgment that, while speech may be
regulated, such regulation must ordinarily be based upon an analysis
of the speech in question within the factual context of its publication."
II
Any doubt about the applicability of the First Amendment to stu-
dent expression was removed in 1969, when the Supreme Court de-
cided Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.1 4
The Court's basic premise was that,
10. Particular facts are so important that courts refuse to permit regulation on the
basis of experience in previous similar events. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 294-95(1951):
The court below has mistakenly derived support for its conclusion from the evi-
dence ... that appellant's religious meetings had, in the past, caused some dis.
order. There are appropriate pu lic remedies to protect the peace and order of the
community if appellant's speeches should result in disorder or violence . . . .We
do not express any opinion on the propriety of punitive remedies which the New
York authorities may utilize. We are here concerned with suppression-not punish.
ment.
In National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, Civil No. 72-1737 (4th Cir., filed
Feb. 5, 1973), a school board had refused to rent a school auditorium to the Party
despite the general availability of the auditorium for public and private use. Tie court
held the denial improper, observing that, "re]ven if the record showed some history
of violence attendant upon the Party's meetings, or some threat of violence by hostile
spectators, it would not constitute a proper basis for restraining the Party's otherwise
legal first amendment activity." Id. at 8 n.4.
11. The ban against prior restraints has a long history reaching back to the common
law of England in the eighteenth century. When the First Amendment was adopted in
1791, it was clearly intended to include the common law position against prior restraints.
See Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraints, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PRo. 648, 651-52
(1955).
12. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971), quoting Organization
for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971). The Times Court also quoted
from Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963): "Any system of prior re-
straints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against Its con-
stitutional validity." 403 U.S. at 714.
13. There is, of course, the danger that regulations of time, place and manner will
be applied, not only as neutral traffic regulations, but also as a means of weeding out
in advance exercises of speech deemed undesirable. Because of this danger, regulations
which purport to govern time, place and manner, but which may allow disguised con-
trols on content-because they are vague or grant excessive administrative discretion-are
likely to be characterized judicially as prior restraints. See note 8 supra. See generally
Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 539-43 (1970).
14. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker junior and senior high school students were sus-
pended for wearing black armbands to school to dramatize their opposition to the war
1328
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[i]n our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totali-
tarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over
their students. Students in school as well as out of school are "per-
sons" under our Constitution.... In the absence of a specific show-
ing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, stu-
dents are entitled to freedom of expression of their views."0
Proceeding to define those "constitutionally valid reasons," the Court
focused on the "special characteristics of the school environment,"10
and concluded that regulation of students' speech is improper unless
there is a showing of "facts which might reasonably have led school
authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference
with school activities, [or if] disturbances or disorders on the school
premises in fact occurred."'1 Since neither condition was met in
Tinker, the regulation there was declared invalid.
That part of the Tinker standard which allows regulation to be
based on the "forecast" of disruption has inevitably attracted litigation.
Courts have been asked to determine whether it is proper, as a means
of making that forecast, to require students to submit for prior ap-
proval any printed matter they wish to distribute on school premises.
At its core, the question is whether Tinker sanctions prior restraints
in the school setting when they are impermissible in society generally,
i.e., whether the school's special need for order justifies a forecast made
only on the basis of content, without more "facts" as to actial effect.
While plaintiffs challenging such regulations have uniformly prevailed,
most courts have declined to hold prior restraints per se inappropriate
in high schools. At the moment, there is a clear majority and minority
rule in the federal courts of appeal on this question. The majority rule,
endorsed by the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits, is that prior re-
straints applied through systems of advance submission of materials are
permissible in high schools if they include adequate safeguards. These
safeguards include criteria for determining forbidden material, prompt
decisions concerning permission to distribute and, in some circuits,
in Vietnam. The armbands were worn just before the Christmas holiday season in de-
fiance of a policy adopted by Des Moines school principals on December 14 that pro.
hibited the wearing of armbands in schools. The Supreme Court held that the activiaties
of high school students were protected by the First Amendment "applied in light of
the special characteristics of the school environment." Id. at 06.
15. Id. at 511.
16. Id. at 506.
17. Id. at 514. The test adopted was taken from Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744,
749 (5th Cir. 1966):
Certainly where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden
conduct would "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school," the prohibition (of ex-
pression) cannot be sustained. Burnside v. Byars, supra, at 749.
393 U.S. at 509.
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speedy appeal from adverse decisions. The minority rule, adopted so
far only by the Seventh Circuit, is that prior restraints are wholly in-
appropriate in high schools.
The leading case for the majority rule is Eisner v. Stamford Board of
Education.18 Plaintiffs, students at a public high school in Connecticut,
were publishers of a mimeographed newspaper entitled the Stamford
Free Press. They had distributed three issues off school grounds with-
out incident. In response to attempts to circulate the fourth issue on
school grounds, the Board of Education promulgated a regulation for-
bidding the distribution of written matter on school premises without
the prior approval of the school administration. The students there-
upon sued for declaratory and injunctive relief.10 The Second Circuit,
declining to adopt the alternative theory of the district court that prior
restraints are impermissible in high schools, 20 held that the specific
regulation in question was void for procedural inadequacies.21
In Quarterman v. Byrd,22 the Fourth Circuit followed Eisner's lead
in sanctioning prior restraints. A tenth-grade student had twice been
suspended for distribution of an underground newspaper in violation
of a school rule which required the permission of the high school prin-
cipal to distribute written material in the school. 23 The court struck
18. 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971), noted in 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1005 (1972) and 46
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 425 (1972).
19. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 832 (D. Conn. 1970). The regula-
tion in Eisner stated: "No person shall distribute any printed or written matter on
the grounds of any school or in any school building unless the distribution of such
material shall have prior approval by the school administration." Id. at 833. The
board's published guidelines for granting or denying approval specified:
No material shall be distributed which, either by its content or by the manner of
distribution itself, will interfere with the proper and orderly operation and dis-
cipline of the school, will cause violence or disorder, or will constitute an invasion
of the rights of others.
Id. at 834.
20. In its opinion, the Second Circuit said:
We do not agree with the district court, however, that reasonable and fair regula-
tions which corrected those [procedural] defects but nevertheless required prior
submission of material for approval, would in all circumstances be an unconsti-
tutional "prior restraint."
440 F.2d at 805.
21. In Eisner, the court developed its view of adequate procedural safeguards from
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). See 440 F.2d at 810. Freedman held that
regulation of obscenity in motion pictures could be accomplished through a licensing
system, if accompanied by adequate procedural guidelines. The court in Eisner re-
quired a speedy initial clearance procedure and a clear specification of to whom and
how material was to be submitted. Id. at 810-11. Some cases since Eisner have, in ad-
dition, required a prompt review procedure of any initial denial of approval by school
officials. See notes 25 & 27 infra.
22. 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971).
23. The regulation challenged in Quarterman provided: "Each pupil is specifically
prohibited from distributing, while under school jurisdiction, any advertisements, pain-
phlets, printed material, announcements or other paraphernalia without the express
permission of the principal of the school." 453 F2d at 55.
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down the rule, not because prior restraints are impermissible,24 but
because the rule had procedural defects. 25 The Fifth Circuit also fol-
lowed the lead of Eisner in Shanley v. Northeast Independent School
District,28 involving the distribution of an underground newspaper.
Under the particular facts of this case-the distribution was off-campus
and not during school hours, the newspaper was innocuous and there
were procedural inadequacies27-the court held that the prior restraint
was unconstitutional. But the court clearly stated its agreement with
the view in Eisner that "[t]here is nothing unconstitutional per se in
a requirement that students submit materials to the school administra-
tion prior to distribution."28
By contrast, the Seventh Circuit, in Fujishima v. Board of Educa-
tion,2'9 held prior restraints unconstitutional. The case involved a Chi-
cago Board of Education rule which was almost identical to the regu-
lation challenged in Eisner.30 Two plaintiffs in Fujishima had been
suspended for circulating 850 copies of an underground newspaper be-
fore and between classes and during lunch breaks. A third had been
suspended twice: once for giving another student an unsigned copy of
a petition calling for a teach-in concerning the war in Vietnam; and
once for handing out fifteen to twenty leaflets about the war during
a fire drill, while he and his classmates were in their assigned positions.
The court declined to confine its ruling to the procedural deficiencies
of the regulation. Eisner's approval of prior restraints, according to this
court, was "unsound constitutional law." 3'
24. [S]chool authorities may by appropriate regulation, exercise prior restraint upon
publications distributed upon school premises during school hours in those special cir-
cumstances where they can "reasonably 'forecast substantial disruption of or ma-
terial interference with school activities'" on account of the distribution of such
printed material.
Id. at 58.
25. In addition to the requirements stated in Eisner, see note 21 supra, Quarterrnan
required a permissible rule to have "procedural safeguards in the form of an 'ex-
peditious review procedure' of the decision of the school authorities." Id. at 59.
26. 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972). The regulation in Shanley read:
Be it further resolved that any attempt to avoid the school's established procedure
for administrative approval of activities such as the production for distribution
and/or the distribution of petitions or printed documents of an) kind, sort, or
type without the specific approval of the principal shall be cause for suspension ....
Id. at 965 n.l. Five students in Shanley were suspended for violating this provision.
27. The court in Shanley required a clear statement as to the means by which students
were to submit material to school officials, a speedy decision by these officials, an ap-
pellate mechanism, and a reasonably prompt decision by this mechanism. Id. at 978.
28. Id. at 969.
29. 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972).
30. The school regulation challenged in Fujishimia read: "No person shall be per-
mitted.., to distribute on the school premises any books, tracts, or other publications,
... unless the same shall have been approved by the General Superintendent of schools."
Id. at 1356.
31. Id. at 1359.
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These cases32 and their progeny 33 indicate the need for an authorita-
tive resolution of the prior restraint question. That resolution requires
a fuller understanding of the Tinker test and an inquiry into the na-
ture of the high school as an institution.
III
On its face, the Tinker rule, which permits regulation to be based
on a "forecast" of disorder, might seem to sanction prior restraints as a
means of making that forecast. This possibility must be dismissed, how-
ever, when the relationship of the Tinker test to other tests is under-
stood. Consider the "clear and present danger" and the "incitement"
tests.3 4 They are of the same type as the Tinker test in two respects.
First, each identifies a level of disorder justifying state regulation of
speech. And second, each is "prediction" oriented: Neither requires
the state to wait until the forbidden level of disorder has developed
before taking action. But neither test-notwithstanding the sanction for
regulation based on prediction-has been thought to authorize prior re-
straints as a means of disorder prediction. 35 These tests differ from the
Tinker test in the level of disorder which justifies regulation, not in
the means of prediction which are appropriate.
This reading of Tinker, concluding that its test provides no justifi-
cation for prior restraints in high schools, is supported at a number of
32. Another case, Riseman v. School Committee, 439 F.2d 148 (1st Cir. 1971), pre.
ceded Eisner, and seems to have taken a position approving prior restraints, but did not
explicitly so state. In commenting upon a school regulation the court said, "More in-
portantly, as sought to be applied to First Amendment activities, it . . . does not reflect
any effort to minimize the adverse effect of prior restraint, Freedman v. Maryland, 880
U.S. 51 .... " 439 F.2d at 149-50. The statement implies that prior restraints may be
permissible if procedurally sound. The citation of Freedman adds weight to this ln-
ference, since that case held that censorship of obscenity in motion pictures could be
accomplished through a licensing scheme, if accompanied by adequate procedural guide-
lines. See note 47 infra.
33. Koppell v. Levine, 347 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), involved a suit to obtain a
declaratory judgment that a system of prior restraints imposed by a New York City
high school was unconstitutional. Though the court refused to reach this issue, because
the case did not involve an actual dispute, it made clear that it would follow Eisner
in permitting prior restraints if accompanied by adequate procedural guidelines. Id.
at 464-65.
In Baughman v. Freienmuth, 343 F. Supp. 487 (D. Md. 1972), students sought a de.
claratory judgment as to the unconstitutionality of a rule requiring all non.school spon-
sored student publications to be approved by the school principal prior to distribution
in the school. The court followed Quarterman in permitting prior restraints and it
requiring adequate procedures for initial determination. However, whereas Quarterman
had required an appeals procedure, arguably on a misreading of Eisner (Compare 440
F.2d at 810-11 with 453 F.2d at 59-60), the district court concluded that Quarterman
held only that the Eisner safeguards were applicable, and proceeded to read Eisner for
itself. The result was that the court did not require an appeals procedure. See 343
F. Supp. at 492.
34. See note 9 supra.
35. See note 9 & p. 1327 supra.
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points in the opinion. First, there is the Court's reference in the test
itself to the need for "facts" as the basis for a prediction of disruption.30
It is apparently such "facts" which distinguish a valid "prediction" of
disturbance from the "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of dis-
turbance [which] is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression" in high schools.37
It might be argued that the special institutional characteristics of
high schools warrant prior restraints, even though they are not per-
mitted in society at large. Certainly some institutions, such as the mili-
tary, prisons and mental hospitals, impose severe restrictions on the
rights of their inmates to engage in speech or to communicate with
others.38 But for First Amendment purposes, if not for others, the dif-
ferences between these institutions and schools are more important
than their similarities. The similarities are primarily that both kinds
of institution perform a function which requires the exercise of dis-
ciplinary control over the lives of their "inmates." But the other insti-
tutions were created to serve distinct purposes: protecting national
security, or segregating criminal offenders and sometimes rehabilitating
them. Schools, by contrast, have the judicially-acknowledged purpose
of preparing students to be fully participating citizens-a purpose which
requires, among other things, that schools serve as an arena for free ex-
pression, in which citizens first flex (and appreciate) the First Amend-
ment rights of speech.39
36. See p. 1329 supra.
37. 393 U.S. at 508.
38. For commentaries on prison inmates' First Amendment rights, see the collection
of sources cited in Note, Prison Mail Censorship and the First Amendment, 81 YALE
L.J. 87 n.5 (1971). An excellent discussion of the First Amendment rights of members
of the military is in Sherman, The Military Courts and Servicemen's First Amendment
Rights, 22 HASrINGs L.J. 325 (1971).
39. In his opinion for-the Court in Tinker, Justice Fortas said:
The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students
during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of activities. Among these
activities is personal intercommunication among the students. This is not only an
inevitable part of the process of attending school; it is also an important part of
the educational process.
393 U.S. at 512.
Earlier Supreme Court cases which dealt with teachers, rather than students' rights,
also affirmed the basic harmony between educational goals and the purposes of the
First Amendment. In Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), quoted in Tinker,
Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, said:
The classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas." The Nation's future de-
pends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of
ideas which discovers truth "out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than through
any kind of authoritative selection." United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp.
362, 372.
Id. at 603.
Keyishian, in turn, quoted Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), where the Court
said, "The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than
in the community of American schools:' 364 U.S. at 487.
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Moreover, Tinker itself forecloses any justification for prior re-
straints based on an analogy to more rigid institutions. "School offi-
cials," the Court noted, "do no; possess absolute authority over their
students. ' 40 The Court also cites approvingly a district court opinion
which "pointed out that a school is not like a hospital or a jail en-
closure." 41 It is no totalitarian "enclave" in need of special speech
restrictions. 42
The discussion thus far has assumed the non-existence of extraordi-
nary problems of order and discipline. The presence of such problems,
resulting from circumstances of stress and agitation, would not seem to
justify imposition of a system of advance submission. As always, ex-
pression may be controlled by reasonable regulations of time, place,
and manner. Reasonableness, of course, depends on the environment
in which expression is published. In a high school with a tense atmos-
phere more stringent rules would be appropriate, i.e., there might be
fewer places and times when the distribution of material would be rea-
sonable. Restraints would apply to any material, without prior scru-
tiny of content. Also, the reasonableness of the regulations established
would be subject to challenge in court.4 3
In sum, neither the nature of the Tinker test, nor the nature of the
high school as an institution, whether in calm or stormy times, warrants
prior restraints in high schools where they would not be warranted in
society at large.
IV
Outside the school context, obscenity is the only area in which prior
restraints on the distribution of printed matter may be permissible.
If, as argued, the proper test for the validity of prior restraints in high
school is their validity in analogous non-school situations, the question
remains whether obscenity provides an adequate rationale for a high
school system requiring the prior screening of publications.
The restrictions on obscenity restraints in society at large are so
severe as practically to foreclose a prior restraint system. 44 While the
Supreme Court has acknowledged "the State's power to prevent the
distribution of obscene matter, '45 the only statutory scheme it has
40. 393 U.S. at 511.
41. Id. at 512 n.6.
42. Id. at 511.
43. See p. 1327 supra.
44. See Monaghan, supra note 13, at 539.
45. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959).
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approved for printed materials-that of New York 4"-did not require
advance submission. 47 Instead, the New York system placed the burden
on city officials to discover the obscene materials, and seek an injunc-
tion against the sale or distribution of specific items. This precedent
would not appear to justify a system which required the advance sub-
mission of all published matter in the search for obscenity, either with-
in or without the high school context.
Moreover, obscenity, properly defined, has not been the primary
issue in the cases which have arisen since Tinker. Advocacy of militant
action,48 controversial opinions,49 borderline libel, '5° and vulgar or
profane language"' are the aspects of such journalism that seem to
cause concern-and these cannot be reached by a restraint couched in
terms of obscenity. 2
46. See Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
47. Thus far, the Supreme Court has sanctioned a permit system only when applied
to motion pictures. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
48. In Quarterman, for example, one of the underground newspapers distributed by
the students concluded an article with an exhortation, in capital letters, reading in part
as follows:
We have to be prepared to fight in the hall and in the classrooms, out in the streets
because the schools belong to the people. If we have to-we'll burn the buildings
of our schools down to show these pigs that we want an education that won't
brainwash us into being racist ....
453 F.2d at 55-56.
49. One of the student plaintiffs in Fujishimia had been suspended for distributing
leaflets and petitions concerning the war in Vietnam. 460 F.2d at 1356. In addition.
student publications have sometimes criticized existing school policy and, by necessary
implication, the school officials who formulate it. See, e.g., Scoville v. Board of Educ.,
425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970).
50. Sometimes, the publications which incur the greatest administrative wrath are
those which criticize or ridicule high school officials. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Houston, 307
F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Tex. 1969). Students published a newspaper which included a satire
in the form of a speech by a hypothetical administrator. Id. at 1348. The court re-
fused to permit the regulation of non-libelous attacks on school officials. Id. at 1341.
In Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F. Supp. 238 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), a high school student was
suspended for his attempt to distribute a publication which referred to the principal
as "King Louis," "a big liar" and a person having "racist views and attitudes." . at 240.
51. In Koppell v. Levine, 347 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), the court characterized
language in the publication as "the kind heard repeatedly by those who walk the street
[sic] of our cities . . . and deal with youth in an open manner." 347 F. Supp. at 459.
The court found, however, that it was not subject to regulation on obscenity grounds
because it "contained no extended narrative tending to excite sexual desires or consti-
tuting a predominant appeal to prurient interest." Id.
Sullivan v. Houston Ind. School Dist., 333 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D. Tex. 1971), held that
a newspaper containing a letter to the editor which several times used variants of the
word "fuck" was not obscene, but simply vulgar. Accordingly, it could not be restrained
by school officials. Id. at 1162-67.
52. The Supreme Court has recently made clear that more than vulgarity or pro-
fanity is needed to bring into play a state's authority to regulate ohscenity. In Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), Cohen wore a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft"
into a corridor of a courthouse. The Court held the expression was not obscene and
said, "Whatever else may be necessary to give rise to the States' broader power to pro-
hibit obscene expression, such expression must be, in some significant way, erotic." Id.
at 20. See note 51 supra.
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With the diminution of dissent, there may be diminished inclination
to challenge school regulations governing distribution of materials on
campus. Absence of challenge (or tacit acceptance) would be unfortu-
nate, since it would prolong the life of an undesirable precedent sanc-
tioning the imposition of prior restraints.
At some time, almost certainly, the question will be raised again.
Then courts will hopefully adopt the sound position taken by the
Seventh Circuit, forbidding prior restraints. In the circuits which have
adopted a contrary view, the matter deserves reconsideration.
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